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REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

INTRODUCTION
Respondent seeks a rehearing on this court's opinion
invalidating § 78-12-31.1. Respondent's petition raises three
entirely new arguments.

Raising these arguments at this point is

improper, and abusive of the rehearing process. Moreover,
respondent's arguments are unfounded and unsupported by Utah law.
ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT, HAVING FAILED ON APPEAL TO RAISE THE ISSUES
PRESENTED IN HER PETITION FOR REHEARING HAS WAIVED HER RIGHT
TO RAISE THESE ISSUES.
In her Petition for Rehearing, respondent, for the first

time raises three points in support of her view that this court's

decision was incorrect.

None of the arguments raised by

respondent were raised on appeal before this court, either in
briefs or at oral argument.

At no time did respondent challenge

or question this court's authority to determine the
constitutionality of § 78-12-31.1. Presumably, respondent is
displeased with this court's holding that the restrictive statute
of limitations set forth in § 78-12-31.1 renders it
unconstitutional.

Nevertheless, respondent was put on notice

that the constitutionality of § 78-12-31.1 was being challenged
and that this court was the forum to which the constitutional
challenge was presented.

Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure provides that a rehearing may be sought when a party
believes the court "overlooked" or "misapprehended" the argument
presented on appeal.

Implicit in the Rule is the requirement

that a Petition for Rehearing seek court review of arguments
presented below when there is a good faith basis for believing
the argument was not fully or clearly understood by the court.
Respondent subverts the policy underlying a Petition for
Rehearing by asking the court to consider new arguments after
failing to convince this court of the correctness of her original
position.

Allowing respondent to raise new arguments at

rehearing amounts essentially to a grant of an entirely new
hearing, not merely a rehearing of the issues which were
addressed and correctly understood by this court.
II.

THIS COURT HAS THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO DECLARE A STATE
LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Respondent invokes Article VIII, section 2 of the Utah
2

Constitution in support of her view that only the Utah State
Supreme Court can declare state laws unconstitutional.

However,

Article VIII, section 2 was codified years prior to the creation
of this court.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of this court, set

forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 includes "appeals from orders
on petitions for extraordinary relief sought by persons who are
incarcerated . . . ".

Petitioner properly sought review from

this court of the dismissal of his writ by the trial court based
on his failure to file within the 90-day time period.
III. THIS COURT WAS MANIFESTLY CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT ARTICLE
I, SECTION 5 OP THE UTAH CONSTITUTION PROVIDED PETITIONER A
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED REMEDY FOR CHALLENGING THE
LEGALITY OF HIS CONVICTION.
a.

The remedy of writ of habeas corpus is not limited
to jurisdictional challenges.

Respondent scolds this court for it's conclusion that
Article I, section 5 of the Utah Constitution provides appellant
the right to collaterally attack his conviction by way of a
Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus.

In support of this claim,

respondent relies on turn-of-the-century case law.

Respondent

also refers to the Utah Supreme Court case of Hurst v. Cook, 777
P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989) as supporting the proposition that writs of
habeas corpus were limited to challenging only jurisdiction.
Even a cursory reading of Hurst demonstrates that it stands first
and foremost for the proposition that "habeas corpus has become a
procedure for assuring that one is not deprived of life or
liberty in derogation of a constitutional right, irrespective of
whether the error was categorized as jurisdictional or non3

jurisdictional."

Id. at 1034. The Hurst opinion is laden with

language highlighting the significant importance of the writ of
habeas corpus to American constitutional protections.

"[T]he

writ of habeas corpus is one of the most important of all
judicial tools for the protection of individual liberty."

Id.

The Hurst opinion makes abundantly clear that in Utah, postconviction relief and the writ of habeas corpus1 are not separate
procedures, but rather "the writ of habeas corpus has, over the
years, absorbed the post-conviction relief remedy to form a
single constitutional remedy."

Id. at 1033.

The import of the Hurst opinion could not be more clear:
"The function of a writ of habeas corpus as ci post-conviction
remedy is to provide a means for collaterally attacking
convictions when they are so constitutionally flawed that they
result in fundamental unfairness and to provide for collateral
attack of sentences not authorized by law."

Id. at 1035.

Respondent's citing to Hurst for the proposition that writs of
habeas corpus are limited to challenging jurisdiction borders on
misrepresentation.

Moreover, the Hurst opinion cited as

precedent Thompson v. Harris, 106 Utah 32, 144 P.2d 761 (1943)
which recognized that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be
regarded woodenly, but rather, that this "precious safeguard of
personal liberty" should not be limited to only jurisdictional
questions.

Id. at 766.

The inanity of respondent's restrictive interpretation of
the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus remedy is demonstrated
4

by application of her analysis to § 78-12-31.1.

If in fact the

statute of limitations embodied in that section is interpreted as
respondent now suggests, then the 90-day limitation period would
only apply to those writs based on jurisdictional challenges and
not to post-conviction relief or petitions misidentified as writs
of habeas corpus which challenge convictions on bases other than
jurisdiction.

Certainly, given the legislative debate

surrounding § 78-12-31.1, it cannot legitimately be argued that
the legislature intended anything other than application of the
limitations period to all post-conviction writs and not to those
which challenged only jurisdiction.

Respondent's argument falls

flat in the face of clearly delineated legislative intent and
purpose.
b.

Section 78-12-31.1 is so restrictive as to amount
to suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in
violation of Article I, section 5.

Respondent relies on the authority of two out-of-state cases
in arguing that § 78-12-31.1 does not violate Utah's antisuspension clause.

Both of these cases are so factually and

analytically inapposite as to provide virtually no support for
respondent's assertion.

In In Re Petition of Runyan, 121 Wash.

2d 432, 853 P.2d 424 (1993) the Washington Supreme Court
addressed a challenge to a one-year statute of limitations for
post-conviction, collateral relief.

Petitioners in Runyan were

arguing that this time limit suspended the writ of habeas corpus
in violation of the Washington Constitution.

The challenged

statute in Washington was not limited to writs of habeas corpus,
5

but applied to all post-conviction petitions.

The Court, in

upholding the limitations provision noted throughout its opinion
that the challenged statute provided for numerous safeguards.
Also noteworthy to the Court was the fact that the statute
contained numerous exceptions, including, the discovery of new
evidence or convictions obtained with insufficient evidence.
at 431.

Id.

In fact, the Runyan court specifically stated that "a

strict statute of limitations on all habeas petitions would be a
derogation of the common law writ of habeas corpus and hence, an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ."

Id.

What this court was faced with on appeal was the definitive
strict statute of limitations on all habeas petitions, not the
relaxed and broadly exemptive provision challenged in Washington.
Moreover, as respondent neglects to note, the statute challenged
in Washington was a one-year statute of limitations as opposed to
the strikingly restrictive 90-day statute which this court
legitimately invalidated.
In Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. 1992), also relied
on by respondent, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed
petitioner's challenge to a three-year statute of limitations for
post-conviction relief.

Again, the statute challenged in

Tennessee addressed petitions for post-conviction relief and not
specifically writs of habeas corpus.
is ignored by respondent.

This critical distinction

The Tennessee Supreme Court held that

the statute of limitations on the filing of post-conviction
petitions was inapplicable to habeas corpus proceedings.
6

The

Court went on to note a theoretical and statutory distinction in
Tennessee between writs of habeas corpus and post-conviction
petitions.

This distinction was explicitly rejected by the Utah

Supreme Court in Hurst.

The Tennessee court said that the

statute of limitations provision would not effect the filing of
writs of habeas corpus except to the extent that the habeas
petitions were properly treated by courts as post-conviction
petitions.
62.

"Habeas corpus has no statutory time limit."

Id. at

Again, it is worth noting that the statute challenged in

Tennessee was a comparatively generous three-year statute of
limitations.
Unlike the Washington and Tennessee statutes, the Utah
statute of limitations specifically names and singles out for
limitation all writs of habeas corpus.

The statute was meant to

apply to all writs collaterally attacking a conviction.

The

breadth and scope of the statute coupled with a lack of any
safeguards violates the anti-suspension clause of our State
Constitution.

An analysis of the cases relied on by respondent

demonstrates the correctness of this conclusion.
IV.

BECAUSE ARTICLE I, SECTION 5 PROVIDES PETITIONER WITH A
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED REMEDY, THIS COURT WAS CORRECT IN
REQUIRING RESPONDENT TO DEMONSTRATE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
§ 78-12-31.1.
Because this court correctly concluded that Article I,

section 5 gave appellant a constitutionally guaranteed civil
remedy protected from infringement by Article I, section 11 of
the Utah Constitution, application of the two-part test set out
in Berry ex rel. Berry v, Beech Aircraft Corp,, 717 P.2d 670
7

(Utah 1985) was entirely correct.

Of course, respondent asserts

she was not required to defend the constitutionality of § 78-1231.1 and makes no defense of the constitutionality of that
statute in her petition.

However, because the writ of habeas

corpus is considered a post-conviction remedy entitled to Article
I, section 11 protection, this court conducted the analysis
required by Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah
1989) . Respondent simply refuses to assume her burden.
Respondent's position is understandable, the statute is
indefensible.

Unfortunately, rather than conceding the manifest

unconstitutionality of the 90-day limitation, respondent
unjustifiably seeks rehearing, further delaying petitioner a
right to be heard by the trial court on the merits of his writ.
CONCLUSION
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing is without merit.
Presenting new arguments for this court's consideration at
rehearing is improper.

This court is specifically granted

authority to review petitioner's appeal.

This court was correct

in finding that the writ of habeas corpus remedy in Utah is
regarded as a significant constitutional protection.

The severe

limitation placed on this remedy by § 78-12-31.1 amounts to
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in violation of Article
I, section 5.

Respondent has failed to convince this court of

the constitutionality of § 78-12-31.1 as required when this court
finds a violation of Article I, section 11. This court's opinion
striking down the 90-day statute of limitations was correct and
8

fully supported by Utah law.

Respondent's Petition for Rehearing

should be denied.

2k

Respectfully submitted this

ry^

day of October, 1993.
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American Civil Liberties Union
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